shunya tenders

Sealed bids
no one can peek at.

Government tenders are already "sealed", but by encryption with a key the portal holds, so they can be opened early. We replace the key with a commitment: nothing to decrypt, and anyone can verify the winner.

The problem, on the recordSee it happen →

Sealed bids only help if no one can read them early. Today someone can, and audits show they do.

77,554
Odisha tenders decrypted before opening time (CAG, 2025)
685 days
gap in same-tender bid decryption, Punjab (CAG, 2023)
0
cryptographic time-locks preventing early opening

How a Shunya tender works

1 · Seal
Each bidder posts a commitment H(bid, salt), an opaque hash. No key exists.
2 · Freeze
At the deadline the set of commitments is locked on a public, append-only board.
3 · Reveal
Bidders open their commitments. No-shows forfeit EMD and cannot win.
4 · Award
Lowest valid bid wins by a public rule. Anyone re-computes it.

Why it can't be gamed the same way

No key to abuse
A commitment has no decryption key. Early opening isn't against the rules — it's impossible.
No discretion
The winner is arithmetic over public reveals. The authority can't quietly pick someone else.
Anyone can verify
A losing bidder, journalist or citizen re-checks the whole tender in their browser.
🔓 See the status quo The key-holder peeks, leaks the lowest bid, and a favoured firm wins by a hair. Open → ▶ Run a live tender Sealed bids the operator can't read, a verifiable award, and a public board you can re-check or tamper with. Open → 🛡 Anonymous bidding A zero-knowledge proof lets eligible firms bid without revealing who they are. Open →